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specimen(s). Existing practices (Article 73.1.4) allow types of endangered species to remain alive and the specimen represented by an illustration or photograph, even if not collected (Dubois & Nemésio 2007 , Rocha et al. 2014 . The collection and preservation of types is recommended (Recommendation 16C) but an uncollected type specimen is not in itself grounds for invalidating a species description. Regardless, the organism is the type, not an image or DNA sequence derived from the organism. Thus, the Code's flexibility accommodates both changes in knowledge over time and potential conservation needs.
Philosophical arguments aside, the proposal by Garraffoni & Freitas does not in any way advance the speed or precision of taxonomic work, or the cause of conservation. In reality, it would reduce the value of type specimens and their descriptions, creating taxonomic hearsay at best. Regarding detailed imaging of specimens that deteriorate easily, such as the cited meiofauna or larger organisms like ctenophorans, specimens still must be killed and prepared, so there is no efficiency or conservation gain in Garraffoni & Freitas' (2017) proposed practise. These quickly deteriorating organisms may still have DNA available from the remains. So body deterioration does not necessarily imply a complete destruction of a type specimen's characters. Their proposal at best muddies the waters by offering benefits that already exist and worse, would impede science by locking-in immutable images as biological standard bearers, rather than the organisms they represent.
The use of photographs as representatives of uncollected type specimens is not new and has been treated previously (reviewed in Ceríaco et al. 2016) . However, this is very different from the proposal put forth by Garraffoni & Freitas. Their proposal apparently stems from perceived rather than actual limitations of taxonomic practise, and is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of taxonomy: either the proponents do not understand the scientific method or they think that taxonomy is not a science (see Linsley & Usinger 1959; Lipscomb et al. 2003; Wheeler 2004; Will & Rubinoff 2004; Dayrat 2005; Will et al. 2005) . Actual specimens are testable, tangible, and verifiable data sources, something that photographs are not (Rocha 2014) . Anyone can examine a type specimen and test the claims made by the original author(s).
While our main concern pertains to data quality and reproducibility, fraud is also a potential problem. Photographs and similar images are derivative of the actual organism and too easily manipulated; hence, they should not be made the primary standards. The issue is not new. John James Audubon intentionally made images of imaginary fish and mammals, which Rafinesque (1818, 1820) unwittingly described as new species (Markle 1997; Woodman 2016) . Although not taxonomic in content, examples of altered images include those from two papers retracted from Science (McNutt 2014) and "enhanced" images of collembolans supposedly living in human skin (Christiansen & Bernard 2008 , Shelomi 2013 . Recently, two variants of the same photograph were discovered to be published in two different books (d'Udekem d'Acoz & Verheye in press); one was obviously correct and the other skilfully manipulated, presumably in order "to repair" a structure that the authors erroneously believed to have been broken. Should photographs be allowed as types, the very definition of the identity of newly described species may be compromised, either intentionally or unintentionally (see also Aguiar et al. 2017) .
Photographs and other images are useful, important, and excellent tools. Photographs can serve as proxys for the types (as many old illustrations do) and aid in their interpretation. Photographs and video recordings, however, cannot and should not BE type specimens. Biological type specimens must exist in actual, not virtual reality.
